Indiana Law Journal
Volume 15

Issue 3

2-1940

Attorney's Charging Liens
James E. Lesh
Member, Indianapolis Bar

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Commercial Law Commons, and the Legal Profession Commons

Recommended Citation
Lesh, James E. (1940) "Attorney's Charging Liens," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 15 : Iss. 3 , Article 2.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol15/iss3/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law
Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @
Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
rvaughan@indiana.edu.

Article 2

ATTORNEY'S CHARGING LIENS
By JAMES E. LESH*

In litigation affecting their charging liens for fees, Indiana
attorneys have not fared so well. A computation based upon
appealed cases shows they have an all-time winning average of
only 44 per cent. This is not high enough. Based entirely
on Indiana decisions, the primary purpose of this article, therefore, is to point out the mistakes that have been made to date
by attorneys in such proceedings, so that all of us will be less
likely to blunder in the future.
The subject of attorney's charging liens is not one without
difficulties in law. The courts, moreover, certainly have not
been guilty of favoritism toward the profession. But an observation of equal moment is this: Lawyers are entirely too
careless in dealing with their own rights. That human factor
is iesponsible for more losses of liens than is ignorance of the
law. We should be more careful.
Attorney's charging liens, sometimes referred to as special
or particular liens, 1 may be divided into two groups: statutory
liens and equitable liens. As will be seen, while each has many
principles in common, nevertheless there are essential differences which must be kept in mind.
By early legislative enactment there was created the right of
attorneys to hold a lien on judgments procured by their
services. The statute is set out in the margin.2 Its judicial
interpretations are important.
*

Of the Indianapolis Bar.

1 The other class of attorney's liens is the retaining, or general or possessory

lien, governed by different rules.
2 "Any attorney practicing his profession in any court of record in this state
shall be entitled to hold a lien for his fees on any judgment rendered in favor
of any person or persons employing such attorney to obtain the same: Provided,
That such attorney shall, at the time such judgment shall have been rendered,
enter, in writing, upon the docket or record wherein the same is recorded, his
intention to hold a lien thereon, together with the amount of his claim." Acts
1865 (Spec. Sess.), Ch. 59, sec. 1, p. 164; Burns' 1933, sec. 4-3619.
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1. Time for Entering Notice of Statutory Liens. The
statute provides that the notice of intention must be entered
on the judgment docket "at the time" of rendition of judgment.
If the notice is given one day after judgment is recorded, it
is not too late, for the courts3 are willing to give attorneys a
"reasonable" time so to do. But three years is too long; 4
so likewise is twenty-two months.5 The time for entering the
notice, moreover, is not extended during the time pending an
appeal.6 Obviously, of course, it would be impossible to forecast just how long after judgment is recorded an attorney
safely may wait before entering his notice of lien. So the
thing to do is to play safe and enter the notice as promptly as
possible. In this connection, it must be remembered that a
complaint or other proceeding to establish an attorney's
statutory lien is defective if there is a failure to allege that
7
notice of the lien was timely entered.
2. Value of Claim Must be Shown. In the past, attorneys
only too frequently have made the mistake of failing to
appreciate that a mere notice of a claim for attorney's lien in
a given amount is not tantamount to proof that such amount,
or any amount at all for that matter, is due them for their
services. A complaint on an attorney's lien which fails to
allege that the amount of the claim, or lien, has either been
fixed by contract or is of the value asked is demurable.8 As
stated in Adams et al. v. Lee et al.,9 "The question is, therefore, not one of good faith or bad faith. It is simply whether
the naked, unsupported, ex parte statement in a lien proves
value." The court answered the question by declaring that
without some evidence of value of the lien, "it is but an empty
thing."' 0 Since, moreover, as presently will be seen, pros Blair v. Lanning, 61 Ind. 499.
4 Day v. Bowman, et al., 109 Ind. 383.
5 Alderman v. Nelson, et al., 111 Ind. 255.
6 Ibid.
7 Wood v. Hughes, et al., 138 Ind. 179.
s Dunning, et al. v. Galloway, et al., 47 Ind. 182.
9 82 Ind. 587.
10 See, also: Day v. Bowman, et al., supra, note 4; Wood v. Hughes, et al,
supra, note 7.
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ceedings to enforce an attorney's lien may be by informal
action as part of the main suit, as well of course as by independent complaint, it must be borne in mind, as ruled in the
same case, that generally "allegations of value are not
admitted by a failure to controvert them."
A valuable case to keep in mind is that of State of Indiana,
ex rel. Mock et al., v. Bleeke et al.11 That decision illustrates
another of the many pitfalls lawyers may encounter in trying
to establish their liens on judgments procured by their efforts.
Relators, attorneys, there brought suit against the clerk of
court and his bondsmen to recover a sum equal to the amount
of an attorney's lien, which relators timely had entered on the
judgment docket. Ignoring the notice of lien and the rights
of the relators, the clerk had paid to other counsel, for their
use and that of their clients, the entire sum of the judgment.
A demurrer to the complaint was sustained below and the ruling thereon afforded the sole question on appeal. Relators
had averred in the complaint that the amount of their claim
was the reasonable value of their services. Bearing that in
mind, but bearing in mind also that it was necessary for
relators, in order to recover on the clerk's bond, affirmatively
to show a breach of official duty on the part of the clerk,
the reviewing court sustained the judgment below. Its reasoning, entirely sound, for so doing follows:
*

*

The mere filing of Mock and Sons of their declaration
otf
intention to hold a lien on the judgment did not determine the existence or the amount of the same, but left it open for adjudication or
adjustment between the contracting parties." (Citing cases.) "The
act of filing such declaration of intention, in pursuance of the statute,
is an unilateral proceeding, and does not assume to fix the amount due.
Its only purpose is to protect the attorney rendering the service for
whatever amount is actually due, as may thereafter be determined. The
statute itself designates the amount to be stated in such declaration as
a mere claim, and does not purport to state a determined amount. * * *
Until the validity and extent of any such lien is established, no official
duty rested upon the clerk to pay any part of such money to Mock &
Sons, as mere lienholders, whatever his duty may have been to pay the
"*

11 71 Ind. App. 23.
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same to the judgment creditor himself, or the attorneys of record on
behalf of their principal."

The court added that the same rule would apply whether
the lien was statutory or equitable. The opinion does point
out, however, that if relators would take the proper steps to
have the amount of their lien determined, a duty would then
rest upon the clerk to pay them that sum and if he refused to
do so that would constitute a breach of official duty, with
accompanying liability on his bond.
While the lien in controversy in Kennedy et al. v. Eder
et al.12 was said to be one equitable in nature, the principle held
controlling is equally applicable to statutory liens. Under circumstances, here unnecessary to recite, amounting to a fraud
on his attorneys, the plaintiff noted a satisfaction on the judgment docket. Failing to receive compensation for their
services, the attorneys sought to have execution issue for the
amount they claimed was due them. It was held this could
not be done, for that would amount to permitting them to be
the judges of their own case.
Last of the series of cases deserving comment in connection
3
with this phase of the article is McCabe v. Britton et al.1
It holds that, in the absence of a binding contract fixing the
amount, attorneys in divorce cases may not take a valid lien
for fees in an amount in excess of that fixed by the court.
The theory upon which the result was reached was that, since
by statute the husband was required to pay all the reasonable
expenses of the wife in the divorce proceeding, the "sum so
allowed having been determined to be the fair and reasonable
fee, there is no ground left for claiming a further sum as a
lien upon the decree for alimony." Assuming that decision
will stand, it then appears clear it is advisable in that type
case to have a contract with the wife as to the amount of fees
to be paid. Whether the same rule would apply in other
similar cases wherein the defendant by law is required to pay,
for the use of the plaintiff, attorney's fees is questionable.
79 Ind. App. 644.
Is 79 Ind. 224.
12
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From a practical standpoint, however, it would seem to be a
wise course, under most circumstances, to have a contract
with the plaintiff in regard to fees.
3. Procedure to Enforce Statutory Liens. The case of
Clarke v. Harris14 sets out a number of principles dealing with
the enforcement of attorney's liens. (1) Two forms of procedure are open to attorneys in order to obtain an adjudication
of their liens: (a) They may bring an original action in their
own name against the judgment plaintiff, 15 or (b) they may
file an intervening petition in the cause in which the judgment
was rendered. (2) If the former, notice and summons as in
ordinary cases must issue; but if the latter, the proceeding is
said to be summary in character and requires only reasonable
notice to be given. (3) If by way of intervening petition in
the original case, the proceeding may not be attacked on the
ground it was commenced after the term during which the
judgment was rendered. (4) Like the enforcement of all
other liens, the matter comes within the sole jurisdiction of a
court of equity and hence is not triable by jury. (5) On
proper application, either side is entitled to a change of venue
from the judge.
Procedure to enforce an attorney's lien is not, unfortunately,
always so simple a matter as merely selecting which of the
two forms of proceedings to take. It is when fraud, on the
part of either the judgment plaintiff or the judgment defendant,
toward the attorney becomes a factor that the more vexed
questions arise. Before taking up a discussion of those problems, however, some consideration first should be given to
the so-called attorney's equitable lien.
4. Equitable Liens. The first Indiana case giving consideration to that type lien is that of Blankenbaker et al. v. Bank
of Commerce et al.16 In that case it appears petitioners,
attorneys, had procured a divorce and judgment for substantial
alimony for their client. They had failed to enter notice of a
14 76 Ind. App. 185.

15 If there are other necessary or interested parties they should of course
be joined as parties defendant.
36 S5 Ind. 459.
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statutory lien. It had been mutually agreed between client
and them that the recovery for alimony should constitute a
fund to which petitioners were to look for their compensation.
Their suit was in attachment and pending trial the client died
and her administrator was substituted as a party defendant.
The Supreme Court fully approved the theory of the trial
court, which was that since, upon the facts stated, the services
of petitioners were useful and beneficial to the client, the funds
in the hands of the administrator therefore were consequently
impressed with an equitable lien in their favor. In Justice v.
Justice17 it was held an attorney who procured a will to be
set aside for his client and established the latter's right to
share in the estate acquired an equitable lien upon the fund
for his fees, and that such lien was senior to a general judgment lien acquired by another, against the client, after the
contract for legal services was entered into. The Supreme
Court there observed that a court of equity will limit a legal
lien to the actual interest of the judgment debtor in the property, and will fully protect the rights of attorneys who have
prior equitable interests in such property, or in the proceeds
thereof. There again, no statutory lien had been taken.
Koons, Idmr., et al. v. Beach18 is an enlightening and wellconsidered case on this subject. The facts must briefly be
noted in order adequately to understand the scope of the
ruling. An heir individually employed the attorney to assist
the administrator in the collection of a life insurance policy
made payable to the estate. The company had denied the
claim. By reason of the sagacity of the attorney a favorable
compromise was reached and the money was turned over to the
administrator, although no suit yet had been filed. On the
original hearing the court declared it was settled that a statutory lien is not the only lien afforded for the security of the
attorney, in the performance of services beneficial to his client,
and that the fund acquired by the aid of the employed attorney
is burdened by the fee and cannot be relieved by any act of
the client. In its opinion on rehearing, in answer to criticism
17 115 Ind. 201.
iS 147 Ind. 137.
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of counsel, the court admitted its expression "equitable liens"' 19
was not strictly correct, but went on to explain:
"The lien which an attorney is said to have is merely a claim to the
equitable interference of the court for his debt, when he finds that his
client is about to deprive him of it.

*

*

*

"When, therefore, equity is appealed to, the inquiry is not necessary,
did the attorney procure a judgment? but it is, does he present a claim

where the law supplies no remedy as efficient, and where in good conscience the client should not be permitted to defeat the attorney of his
just compensation. One test of this claim, as originally shown, is this:
Was the fund secured by the client through the efforts of the attorney.
And another is: Was the compensation of the attorney expressly or
by implication such a charge against the fund as to amount to an assignment of some part thereof. In either event equity will aid the attorney
in the enforcement of his claim, ordinarily called a lien.
"* * * Therefore, it could not be said that a judgment in favor
of the client is indispensable."

It goes without saying that the foregoing principle often
may be of vital importance in protecting an attorney who,
before the controversy reaches the stage of actual litigation,
procures for his client a fund against which it would be impossible to impress a statutory lien.
While we shall leave until later any extended discussion of
Olczak v. Marchelewicz,20 it here should be observed that one
reason why the attorney there failed in his effort to obtain an
equitable lien was because there remained, at time of suit, no
fund upon which to impress a lien. This is an indispensable
element.

5.

Enforcement of Equitable Liens. Proper procedure to

enforce statutory liens have been set out under point 3, supra.
All that is said there is applicable to the enforcement of equitable liens. There is no need forrepetition.

6.

Protection Against FraudulentSettlements. As already

has been stated, the greatest difficulties to be encountered in
the subject-matter of attorney's charging liens are those arising
in connection with protection against fraudulent settlement
19 It is still
20

constantly used.

98 Ind. App. 244
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between parties which are done in order to beat attorneys out
of their fees.
It may not be doubted that the early ruling in Hanna v.
The Island Coal Co. 2 1 certainly has its limitations today.
There it was held that a client may, as a matter of right, dismiss his suit at any time before judgment, without the consent
of his attorney, and thereby deprive the attorney of opportunity of taking a lien on the judgment. We look to, as stating
the true doctrine, the well-considered case of Miedreich v.
Rank et al.22 It is valuable to us in at least two respects: It
correctly lays down the substantive rights involved, and points
to the method of procedure attorneys may employ when the
fraudulent conduct of the parties adversely affects their chances
of collecting just compensation for their services. In that
case there was no fraud on the part of client. The fraud was
practiced by the defendant, which, by fraudulent misrepresentations, induced the client, for an utterly inadequate consideration, to sign a motion of dismissal of the suit. The attorney
was ignorant of the matter until the motion to dismiss was
filed. He thereupon objected to the dismissal and, by verified
motion, asked leave for permission to prosecute the suit to
final judgment in the name of his client. The motion to dismiss
was granted; the motion to proceed was denied. The Appellate Court reversed. The first point to be noted in the decision
23
is that necessarily limiting the ruling in the Hanna case.
While recognizing the general rule laid down in that case, the
court in the opinion now being considered adopted the following from a New York decision: "The right of the parties thus
to settle is absolute and the settlement determines the cause of
action and liquidates the claim. * * * Of course we do
not refer to dishonest settlements made to cheat attorneys,
which the courts will brush aside with strong hands." Their
power so to do, it is declared, rests upon the inherent powers
of courts to protect their own officers against collusion and
fraud practiced by the parties to the cause. Laying down the
Ind. App. 163.
22 40 Ind. App. 393.
23 Supra, note 21.

21 5
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proper course of procedure for attorneys to take in such
circumstances, the court goes on to hold that if it appears
that such settlement was collusive and consummated pursuant
to the intent of the parties to defraud the attorney, the court
in which the action or suit was pending may interfere to protect
him by setting aside the order of dismissal and permitting him
to proceed in the name of his client as plaintiff to final determination to ascertain what sum of money or interest in the
subject-matter, if any, is due him for his services when fully
performed.
Discussion of the Miedreich case necessarily requires some
notice of one or two later decisions having a bearing upon
similar questions. First of these is Hammond, Whiting, etc.,
R. Co. v. Kaput.24 There it was held that where there was a
judgment below in favor of the plaintiff, and his attorneys took
a lien to secure fees and thereafter, without actual fraud, the
judgment defendant settled with the plaintiff without consent
of the attorneys, the judgment defendant had no ground for
appeal, because the only thing at stake was the attorney's lien.
In opposition to a motion to dismiss, appellant urged it had
the right to appeal in order to try to obtain a reversal and
thus become relieved from the enforcement of the attorney's
lien. Referring to such contention, the court said that was
in effect a concession by appellant that it had been guilty of a
constructive fraud on appellee's attorneys. Partly responsible,
moreover, for the result reached apparently was some misgivings in the minds of the court as to whether, in event of
reversal, the attorneys would then have the right to litigate
the case on their own behalf in order to secure their compensation.
Rested both upon public policy and upon the fact that such
a cause of action is non-assignable, it has been held that
attorneys may not be permitted to prosecute on their own
behalf a suit for enticement of a wife, where, before judgment,
the plaintiff, without the consent of his counsel, voluntarily
25
dismissed the case.
24 61 Ind. App. 54.
25 Gerdink, et al. v. Meginnis, et al., 73 Ind. App. 39.
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It is rather difficult to reconcile all of that which is said in
the recent decision of Olczak v. Marchelewicz 26 with the
ruling in the Miedreich case. 27 In the Olczak case, appellant
was employed by appellee to prosecute a tort action and it
was agreed appellant should receive for his compensation fifty
per cent of anything collected, whether by suit or compromise.
After complaint was filed, appellee surreptitiously settled the
case and paid the appellant attorney nothing. Subsequently,
appellee received a discharge in bankruptcy. Thereafter,
appellant brought suit against him, claiming an equitable lien
on the fund received through the settlement. The judgment
below for appellee was affirmed. Clearly, the correct result
was reached, for the discharge in bankruptcy barred appellant's claim; and, as has been stated heretofore, 28 there was
in existence no fund to which a lien might attach and, therefore, no basis for an equitable lien. 29 Another factor, which
was not noticed by the reviewing tribunal, was that instead of
asking the court to avoid the settlement made by appellee,
as he should have done, appellant, by instituting suit to enforce
the lien, recognized the finality of the settlement and order of
dismissal. But the point in the decision which is vulnerable
to criticism is the statement, based on and citing the Hanna
case, 30 that "no lien can be acquired before judgment, even
by agreement, that will prevent the client from compromising
and releasing his claim without the attorney's consent." Since
the act of the client amounted to a fraud on the attorney, the
general doctrine laid down in the Hanna case was without
application. Instead, if at all opportune, the circumstances
called for a consideration of the principles laid down in the
Miedreich case, which, as stated before, limit the Hanna decision to cases where fraud is not present.
31
There is illustrated in the case of Peterson et al. v. Struby
a situation which attorneys should be careful to avoid. The
26
27
28
29
30

Supra, note 20.
Supra, note 22.
See note 20.
It is likewise so held in Alden v. White, Admr., et al., 32 Ind. App. 393.
Supra, note 21.
31 25 Ind. App. 19.
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attorneys there had procured a judgment for the plaintiff and
had duly entered a notice of attorney's lien. Subsequently,
the plaintiff assigned the judgment to another who, without
receiving any consideration therefor, released the judgment in
full. Since neither the plaintiff nor the assignee would pay the
attorneys their fees, they brought suit against the assignee
to recover from her personally what was due them. Rested
upon the principle that the lien of an attorney for his fees,
if validly entered, cannot be discharged without his authority
by any act of the judgment plaintiff, or his assignee, it was
held the attorneys could not prevail in their action. In other
words, the court took the view that, under the circumstances,
the status of the lien was unchanged; as much so, in fact, as
if the judgment had not been noted satisfied by the assignee.
Before going on to state what procedure the attorneys should
have followed, we direct attention to the declaration of the
court that if appellee had in fact received the amount of the
judgment, then appellants might have recovered "from her
the amount of their lien, 32 as for money had and received."
It is easy to see how counsel in the foregoing case made the
mistake they did. But what they should have done was to
take the following steps: (1) Go into the court where the
judgment was obtained and move to set aside the satisfaction
of the judgment. 3 3 (2) As between themselves and the judgment plaintiff establish the validity of their lien, including the
amount thereof. (3) Proceed to cause execution to issue
against the judgment debtor to the extent of the attorney's
lien.
It appears, from a perusal of the authorities as a whole,
that it would, by appropriate petition, be entirely permissible
to take all three of the foregoing steps in one proceeding, provided such action be in the same court where the original judgment was rendered. In that event, only reasonable notice to
appear, as has been stated previously, 34 would be necessary.
32 Of course, as stated ante, the attorneys first would have had to prove the
value of their services or that there was a contract governing the amount of
the fee.
33 Ibid. See, also: Kennedy v. Eder, supra, note 12.
34 See note 14.
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Such notice, of course, should go to the judgment plaintiff,
to the plaintiff's assignee, if any, and to the judgment debtor.
In this same connection it should be stated that a notice of an
attorney's lien upon the judgment docket is notice to all the
world; no personal notice thereof to the assignee of the judg3
ment plaintiff is necessary. 5
7. Miscellaneous Principles Noted. There remains to be
mentioned but a few miscellaneous'principles that occasionally
may arise and which may prove convenient to bear in mind.
They follow:
The right of an attorney taking a lien for services in procuring a judgment is superior to the right of the judgment debtor
36
to set off any judgment he may have.

An attorney's lien for services, being an incident of the judgment, is as much assignable as the judgment itself. A copy of
the assignment, moreover, need not be carried into the
37

pleading.

Even where an equitable lien is being asserted, the claim
has no vitality if barred by the statute of limitations.3"
It is proper for a party against whom notice of an attorney's
lien has been taken to move, at any time while the lien still
stands, to expunge the claim of lien from the record, if, for
example, the lien is without merit.3

9

This may be done in the

40
same suit or in an independent action.
An attorney's charging lien, as distinguished from a holding
lien, is restricted to the services of the case in which the judgment upon which the lien is taken, and may not extend to, or
protect, other services rendered by the attorney. 41 The case
cited in support of the foregoing deals with statutory liens,
but obviously the same rule would apply to equitable liens.
Peterson, et al. v. Struby, supra, note 31.
36 Adams, et al. v. Lee, et al., supra, note 9; Puett, et al. v. Beard, et al.,
86 Ind. 172.
37 Day v. Bowman, et al., supra, note 4.
38 McNagney, et al. v. Frazier, Ex'r., et al., 1 Ind. App. 98.
39 Clarke, et al. v. Harris, supra, note 14; Vivian Collieries Co. v. Cahall,
184 Ind. 473..
'I
40 Clarke, et al. v. Harris, supra, note 14.
41 Harshman v. Armstrong, et al., 119 Ind. 224.
35
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If, after judgment for the plaintiff, there is an assignment
of the judgment and thereafter the attorneys, with consent of
the assignee, take down the money paid into court and turn
it over to the assignee and mark the judgment satisfied, such
attorneys, if they fail to take out their fees, lose their right
even to an equitable lien on the fund turned over to the
42
assignee.
42 Berry, et al. v. State Bank of Otterbein, et al., 99 Ind. App. 655.

